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The Colonizing Mission 
of the United States in Puerto Rico, 
1898-1930 
Pedro A. Caban 
In the summer of 1H98 the United States allaim·d its long-standing goal of ac-
quiring strategic insular possessions in the Pacific and the Caribbean. More-
over, with its decisive defeat of Spain, U.S. expansionists could rightly claim 
that their nation had achieved imperial status. But the United States not only 
appropriated far-flung exotic islands but ~dso claimed sovereignty over ap-
proximately 10 million inhabitants of the lands ceded by Spain 1 The sober-
ing question that confronted the United States after the euphorL! of military 
victory was the legal status and political rights of these subject peoples. 
Eventually it devised a complicated structure of laws that prescribed a dis-
tinctive citizenship status for the subjects of each of its territorial possessions 
(Smith, 1997: 428). 
While the inhabitants of the territories were all perceived to he so racially 
and culturally different as to justify their permanent exclusion from the 
American polity, U.S. empire builders believed that effective colonial rule re-
quired that they be Americanized. Colonial administrations embarked on 
ambitious campaigns to transform the legal systems and codes of Puerto 
Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines and to install a program of universal public 
education of which English-language instruction was the cornerstone. While 
Americanization, or the colonizing mission, \Yas never a coherent policy, it 
die! identify the general outlines of the institutional transform~ttion and polit-
ical change that the colonial governors were expected to undertake. Colo-
nial officials were permitted. indeed expected, to modify the content of the 
Americanization programs to adjust to local conditions. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the methods and goals of the 
colonizing mission in Puerto Rico during the first thirty years of U.S. rule. I 
document the contradictions inherent in the mission, some of the more 
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salient episodes of opposition. and ultimately the failure of the colonial au-
thorities to attain their imperial objectives. I am more interested in specifying 
the content of this program :tnd how it was related to larger imperial objec-
tives and explaining how paradoxically it created a space for opposition than 
in examining the complex history of the diverse and elaborate attempts by 
Puerto Ricans to deter. modify, or benefit from the Americanization c:tm-
paign.2 I discuss nvo colonial administrations that Congress imposed on 
Puerto Rico. The Foraker Act, in effect from 1900 to 1917, set up a civilian 
colonial administration that accelerated the tr:tnsformation of Puerto Rican 
life inaugurated during the period of military occupation. The .Jones Act 
modified the least democratic and most authoritarian features of the previ-
ou.'> regime but sustained its pursuit of Americanization of the subject popu-
lation. Although the legislation established seemingly different structures for 
colonial rule, in both regimes three departments were pivotal for carrying 
out the colonizing mission of the central government during these three 
decades: the Departments of Education and Interior and the Office of the At-
torney General. 
AMERICANIZATION AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY 
~'hen Hemy Luce prophesied the start of an ''American century-America's 
century as a dominant power" in 1941, the United States bad had territorial 
possessions and colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific since 1898. Schol-
ars differ as to the reasons the United States embarked on war with Spain 
over a century ago, but they concur that by the waning years of the nine-
teenth century the country was rapidly emerging as an economic power with 
global aspirations. l:\'C'r conscious of European designs on the Caribbean 
and expanded commercial presence in the Americas, the Cnited States was 
determined to demonstrate to its competitors that the Western Hemisphere 
was its exclusive sphere of inf1uence. An influential and highly active coali-
tion of manufacturers and export agricultural producers lobbied for an ag-
gressive foreign trade policy, while an ultranationalist cadre of expansionists 
in government, the media, and the academy demanded decisive military ac-
tion against Spain, the last vestige of European power in the Americas. 
This alliance between internationalist corporate capital and an evolving im-
perialist state was in its infancy when the United States embarked on a war 
with the decaying Spanish empire. Over a centllly later, the same array of pub-
lic and private power drives the Summit of the Americas and it'l goal of ne-
oliheral trade liberalization. The expansionism of the late nineteenth century 
was built on an ideological editlce of virulent nationalist social Darvvinism. Im-
perialists preached that the superiority of U.S. institutions was divinely or-
dained and that the nation had a moral imperative to implant these institutions 
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and the values they embodied throughout the hemisphere. The contemporary 
justification for a U.S.-dominated regime of free trade and investment no 
longer relics on racially constituted dogma. Yet it is undeniable that a celchra-
toty, almost chauvinistic, conviction of the superiority of the United States, par-
ticularly the democratic republicanism that is embedded in the free-enterprise 
mentality, underpins the discourse on U.S.-led hemisphere globalization. 
The imperialism of the late ninctecnth century required modernizing the 
political institutions in the "host country" and creating the sociopolitical envi-
ronment that would permit the rational implantation of capitalist production 
relations (Sklar. 1988: 81). Americanization in Puerto Rico and other U.S. ter-
ritorial holdings entailed very similar processes of transformation of political 
institutions, property relations, and class stntcturc. The contemporary dis-
course on globalization underscores the indispensability of liberal democratic 
political institutions because they harmonize with capitalist economic organ-
ization and practice. 3 It is a familiar argument to those who ha\·e studied the 
history of late nineteenth-century and early t\ventieth-century U.S. colonial 
ntle and imperialism. In Puerto Rico, colonial officials had the extraordinary 
opportunity to implant those institutions and practices they believed were 
necessary to effect the colony's transformation into an appendage of the met-
ropolitan economy. While such m crt intervention has disappeared since the 
demise of the Soviet Union, the political corollary of globalization is the ex-
tension of formal democratic systems-preferably the one that prevails in the 
United States-because these have demonstrated their adaptability to the re-
quirements of highly internationalized capital. 
ln 1898 the United States exacted Puerto Rico from Spain as indemnillca-
tion for having lost the war. For almost two years Puetto Rico was a '·depart-
ment" under the jurisdiction of the War Department. During this brief period 
of military rule the foundations for a radical and sustained transformation of 
Puerto Rico·s political institutions, legal codes, and education system were 
firmly established (see Berbusse, 1966; Santiago-Valles, 1994; Caban, 1999). 
On May 1, 1900, the Foraker Act established a civil colonial administration in 
Puerto Rico. By far the most important feature of this administration was the 
Executive Council. It was to be responsible for overhauling Puerto Rico·s po-
litical and judicial institutions, installing an insular constabulary, moderniz-
ing the infrastntcture, and installing a system of public education. In the fol-
lowing pages I will examine three key Executive Council agencies that \\'ere 
responsible for these tasks: the Depattment of Education, the Interior De-
partment, and the Office of the Attorney General. U.S. colonial officials were 
confident that the Executive Council would transform Puerto Rico's institu-
tions and people so that the island-nation would assume ih required role in 
the American century. Since Americanization entailed the implantation of 
gcwernment and judicial institutions patterned on those of the l !nited States, 
the Foraker Act was the first stage of the colonizing mission. 
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THE IDEA OF AMERICANIZATION 
The U.S. acquisition of Puerto Rico and other insular Spanish possessions-
the Philippines, Guam, and Cuba-was a unique event in the history of U.S. 
territorial expansion. First, it was the result of conquest of a European nation 
that had claimed sovereignty over the inhabitants of the islands for over four 
hundred years. These established overseas societies possessed definable cul-
tures, languages, values, and political systems, but they were different from 
each other and each posed distinct challenges to U.S. colonial officials. 
Pue110 Rico and Cuba, for example, were perceived as partially European so-
cieties, while the Pacific islands were popularly viewed as exotic and some-
what more primitive. Nonetheless, by virtue of their cultural, linguistic, and 
racial characteristics the people of the former Spanish possessions were 
judged inferior and would be excluded from the body politic of the United 
States. U.S. colonial officials believed that through a campaign of American-
ization these strange and exotic peoples would be converted into semiliter-
ate, loyal subjects who would apprehend the legitimacy of U.S. sovereignty 
and accept the new political and economic order that would be imposed on 
their societies. Although they would be educated and incorporated into colo-
nial administration and pa1tially assimilated into the norms and values of U.S. 
society, they would forever be barred from full and equal participation in the 
U.S. polity. Politically excluded, these possessions were nevertheless to be 
fully incorporated into the circuit of U.S. production and trade as sugar pro-
ducers and markets for the industrial and agricultural products of the North. 
The rationale for Americanization was popularly pclltrayed as a noble and 
selfless effort to bestow on the unfortunate primitive peoples the posses-
sions and virtues of U.S. civilization. Yet Americanization was driven by a 
strategic and economic calculus that was pivotal to the United States' aspira-
tions for hemispheric hegemony and national security. Political stability and 
social order were vital in these militarily strategic insular possessions. Since 
the islands were destined to be either territories under de facto regulation or 
formal territorial possessions for an unspecified period, their inhabitants had 
to be socialized into accepting as legitimate their subordination and exclu-
sion from the U.S. body politic. The insular possessions were quickly to take 
on an important role in the remarkable expansion of the U.S. economy dur-
ing the first decades of the twentieth century. 
Before the war with Spain, expansionists had envisaged U.S. control of sug-
arcane producing islands in the Pacific and Caribbean and an escape from de-
pendency on imported European beet sugar. By stabilizing and modernizing 
the financial and revenue-generating institutions and adopting business prac-
tices and corporate legal codes from the mainland, colonial officials laid the 
foundations for a rapid transition to capitalism in the underdeveloped and 
war-torn possessions. Such a transformation was not merely economically 
--
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beneficial but politically necessary since the ideology of commercial expan-
sion closely associated capitalism with democracy. Finally, U.S. empire 
builders learned from the experience of their European predecessors and 
quickly moved to create an indigenous cadre of political leaders and man-
agers who would pat1icipate in the task of transforming the colonies. 
While Americanization was never more than a broadly conceived, loosely 
defined conception that rationalized the necessity to transform subject peo-
ples and their institutions in the service of empire, U.S. officials aspired to 
convert Puerto Rico into a e<>mmercial bridge to Latin America and its peo-
ple into ambassadors for t I.S. interests in the hemisphere. Not withstanding 
these grandiose aspirations, which should be viewed with a measure of 
skepticism, Puerto Rico was an invaluable strategic commercial and military 
asset, and the loyalty of its people to the new sovereign had to be secured. 
Americanization was predicated on belief in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon 
cultural and industrial capabilities.4 According to the Senator Albert Bev-
eridge, a vocal ultranationalist of the 1890s, the United States was "an indus-
trial civilization" and had reached such "a state of enlightenment and power" 
that '"its duty to the world as one of its civilizing powers" was to embark on a 
"period of colonial administration'· (Beveridge, 1907: 3-5). The proponents of 
Americanization argued that the United States, because of its Anglo-Saxon 
heritage, was the epitome of industrial modernity and possessed the most dc-
veloped form of republican democracy. As practiced in the overseas posses-
sions, Americanization required English-language instruction to provide the 
subject peoplcs a functional knowledge of the customs, national character, 
and political principles of the nevv sm·ereign. Because it was a process specif-
ically devised by the central government to int1uence the political behavior 
and attitudes of a subject people, Americanization in the insular possessions 
differed from its practice in the United States (sec Caban, n.cl.). 5 It was more 
comprehensive because it called for the systematic replacement of Spanish le-
gal systems and political institutions. The War Department, especially the Bu-
rcau of Insular Affairs, its specialized agency for colonial administration, pe-
riodically had jurisdiction over Puerto Rico, but the bureau's int1uence in 
setting colonial policy was always compelling. 
Although some enthusiastic officials called for the vittual er;tdication of in-
digenous culturc and language, others recognized that it was not only futile 
but unwise to adopt such a radical approach.(' Education Commissioner Ed-
ward Falkner may well have most accurately assessed the objective of AmL'f-
icanization in Puerto Rico in describing it as "our national social laboratory'" 
(Falkner, 190"i: 159-6()). While the process of replacing Puerto Rico·s institu-
tions was impot1ant, Falkner believed that "the primary object of our admin-
istration in Puerto Rico should be to infuse into the political, social and eco-
nomic life of the Puerto Rican people the spirit, rather than the form of 
American institutions" (Falkner, 1908: 171). 
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The political education of Puerto Ricans was a key goal of the American-
ization discourse (U.S. Department of State, 1905: 41). Although colonial 
managers never formally defined what political education entailed, they 
propagated the notion that Puerto Ricans were woefully unprepared to ex-
ercise self-government. This presumed incapacity justified restrictive colonial 
mle and careful oversight of Puerto Rican political behavior (see Go, 2000; 
Clark, 1973). Expressing this imperial arrogance, General George Davis. 
Puerto Rico's last military governor, assured Secretary of War Elihu Root that 
"the knowledge which I possess of the inhabitants of this island .. forces 
me to the conviction that. [self-government] would be a disaster to them and 
to the be.~t interest of their fair island" (U.S. Department of War, l ()00: 75). In 
1899 Root justified .~trict colonial rule by arguing that Puerto Ricans "would 
inevitably fail \vithout a course of tuition under a strong and guiding hand" 
0916: 203). Governor Beekman Winthrop crisply reported that ·'the work of 
U.S. officials \Vas to install American institutions and American governmental 
principles, and to educate the Puerto Rican on these lines" (U.S. Depattment 
of State, 1905: 41). Of course, U.S. officials would ultimately decide if and 
when Puerto Ricans had acquired the capabilities and temperament to exer-
cise self-government in harmony with Anglo-Saxon principles of republican 
democracy. Ironically, the goal of "educating the natives in self-government" 
was stymied by the Bureau of Insular Affairs, which resisted relinquishing 
its centralized control over Puerto Rico. As late as 1932, when jurisdiction 
over Puerto Rico was transferred from the War Dcp:lrlment to the Depart-
ment of the Interior. the Bureau of Insular Affairs asserted that it could su-
pervise the unincorporated territories more efficiently than their inhabitants 
(Clark, 197.3: 2.'\5). 
THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL AND AMERICANIZATION 
The appointed eleven-man Executive Council was a singular institution in 
U.S. territorial history in that it had both executive and legislative functions. 
It was the cabinet of the presidentially appointed governor and the upper 
chamber of the legislature. Six of its eleven members were male citizens of 
the United States, and each was assigned a cabinet post. No fewer than five 
Puerto Weans were appointed to the council, although more than a decade 
would pass before any \Yere put in charge of insular departrnents. Congress 
felt compelled to abandon the hallowed constitutional checks and balances 
here because it feared that otherwise the popularly elected lower house 
would be able to impede the work of the council. This arrangement also en-
sured that the Americanization of Puerto Rico would be closely directed by 
the central government, which virtually prohibited any Puerto Rican partici-
pation. According to William Willoughby, who served as council president, 
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"The greatest freedom was given to the newly constituted government to 
·work out practically every question requiring the exercise of governmental 
authority." He wrote that the council constituted "the center or keystone to 
the whole system" of government ( ll)Q2: 35; 1905: 98). Although the Execu-
tive Council was independent of the War Department, the Bureau of Insular 
Affairs worked closely with it in implementing the colonizing mission. 
While the Executive Council's mandate for transformation vv~ts sweeping 
in its scope and touched virtually every area of Puerto Rican economic and 
political life, three functions predominated. These I identify as ideological, 
developmental, and coercive. These categories do not sufficiently convey 
the diverse and contradictory tendencies and policies that characterized the 
work of the Executive Council, and they were not mutually exclusive. In-
deed, at times they were complementary. For example, laws favorable to for-
eign corporations were enacted and enforced by the attorney general and 
complemented the efforts of the Interior Department to attract U.S. invest-
ment, particularly in sugar. By broadly identifying general tendencies in the 
Americanization campaign, however, we can generate a clearer understand-
ing of imperial thinking as it pertained to transforming the people of Puerto 
Rico into loyal wards of the empire and incorporating the island into the met-
ropolitan economy. The ambitious program to remake Puerto Rico's institu-
tions and people ancl to sustain tlw operations of the colonial administration 
was financed overwhelmingly from internal revenue sources. 
The Department of Education was most directly involved in the ideologi-
cal component of the Americanization process. One of its most important 
tasks was to teach the colonial subjects the language of the colonizer. The 
education commissioners set about to instill popular understanding and ac-
ceptance of U.S. norms, customs, and historical myths. They were keen to 
implant a patriotic spirit and socialize Puerto Ricans into accepting the supe-
riority of U.S. institutions and way of life (see Negr(m de Montilla, 1971; Os-
una, 1949). The department was crucial in constructing and implanting a 
new and alien worldview divorced from the historical context of the Puerto 
Rican people's lived experiences. 
The Depattment of the Interior, the director of health, and the director of 
public charities were charged with developing Puerto Rico's physical and hu-
man infrastructure. The director of public charities and the director of health 
were responsible for staving off mass starvation and destitution and eradicat-
ing the diseases that depleted Puetto Rico's workforce and endangered the 
lives of U.S. colonial officials. Officials were convinced that investments in ed-
ucation and vocational and industrial training would not only improYe the ma-
terial conditions of Puetto Rico·s population but result in significant increases 
in the productivity of labor. Further investments in improved sanitary condi-
tions, public health, and physical education would ensure an ample supply 
of healthy and energetic workers for the emerging industries. The Interior 
122 Pedro A. Cahan 
Department modernized the country's infrastructure through ambitious pub-
lic works projects: irrigation systems, hydroelectric plants, roads, warehouses 
and piers, and a telegraph system. 
The attorney general was the chief legal officer and, like the commis-
sioner of education, was appointed directly by the president. In addition 
to the attorney general, the coercive apparatus of the colonial state in-
cluded the system of local courts, the bureau of prisons, the insular con-
stabulary, the Porto Rico Regiment, and the federal district court. The 
courts were directly engaged in protecting private property, enforcing 
compliance with the laws, apprehending and prosecuting violators of the 
law, and enforcing commercial transactions and contracts. The courts and 
the body of jurisprudence that guided their conduct were among the most 
important institutions for advancing the Americanization of Puerto Rican 
society. Each Executive Council department employed its own staff of 
workers, and collectively this bureaucracy was the primary employer of 
the country's educated and professional strata. As Puerto Ricans were 
hired to work in the colonial administration, they became purveyors of the 
standards and values of the metropolitan power. The attorney general's 
office and the courts, as well as the insular police and the Porto Rico Reg-
iment, were important agents for socialization and legitimated the new in-
stitutional order. Hundreds of Puerto Rican lawyers and judges acquired 
knowledge of a new body of jurisprudence and developed an under-
standing of U.S. legal codes and traditions. Thousands were trained for 
service as government clerks, technicians, managers, tax assessors, police 
officers, laborers, teachers, and so forth. In the midst of the increasing un-
employment and widespread poverty that followed the U.S. occupation of 
Puerto Rico, these workers became dependent on the colonial state for 
their livelihood. 
NEW LAWS AND NEW COURTS 
A court system and a legal code patterned on those in the United States were 
among the most important institutions for advancing the Americanization of 
Puerto Rican society. Two months before General Nelson Miles landed in 
Guanica, Lawrence Lowell (who would become president of Harvard Uni-
versity) insisted in an influential article on the importance of implanting the 
"authority of American courts." It was chiefly by means of the courts and U.S. 
legal codes that the people of Puerto Rico "would acquire our political ideas 
and traditions" (1898: ')8). Indeed, the military governors reported that 
Puerto Rico's legal system was strange and un-American and, according to 
one observer, "seriously obstructed the introduction of American ideas and 
methods" (Wilson, 1905: 105). 
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The Foraker Act set up a three-person commission appointed by the pres-
ident to compile and revise Puerto Rico's laws. By 1902 the Spanish penal 
code and laws of civil and criminal procedures had been replaced with ex-
act duplicates of the California and Montana codes. The commercial codes 
were amended according to the Louisiana Civil Code, while the codes of civil 
and criminal procedure were replaced with analogous legal codes from 
other states (Graffam, 1986: 115; Rivera Ramos, 2001: 70). (Governor William 
Hunt observed, "There is no more ready or more practical method of Amer-
icanizing our new possessions than by the enactment and enforcement of 
American laws, and the introduction and practice of American jurispru-
dence" [U.S. Department of State, 1904: 26]). 
The Office of the Attorney General wielded considerable power. The 
supreme court, district courts, municipal courts, and justice of the peace 
courts all reported to the attorney general. In 1915 the Executive Council es-
tablished a juvenile court system to try minors under the age of sixteen. One 
of the most controversial reforms was the extension of the U.S. federal dis-
trict court system to Puerto Rico. The court was an important institution for 
socializing the population in the norms of the U.S. jurisprudence as well. 
Originally all the presidentially appointed judges were fi·om the United 
States, and its proceedings were and continue to be conducted in English. 
The district court was bitterly opposed by Puerto Rico's political leaders, 
who saw it as an instrument of the metropolitan state to protect the interests 
of its citizens against claims brought by the colonial subjects. Various at-
tempts were made to exclude Puerto Rico from the district court system. R. 
L. Rowe, an important colonial official, observed that "as a distinctly Ameri-
can tribunal it has done much to acquaint the native population, especially 
lawyers, with the procedure of American courts" (Rowe, 1904: 212). 
Although subsequently much of the original legislation was modified, the 
initial alteration of the system of courts, civil and criminal law, and judicial 
procedures was swift and comprehensive. The task of overhauling the legal 
codes was greatly facilitated by the cooperation of the Puerto Rican Repub-
lican party. The Republicans were staunch supporters of the colonial regime 
and had exclusive control of the lower house of the legislature 7 Within a 
decade of the acquisition of Puerto Rico, Willoughby announced that "in no 
other regard have institutions of Porto Rico existing under Spanish rule un-
dergone so complete a change at the hands of the Americans as in respect to 
judicial organization and procedure" (1905: 107). Instead, Puerto Rico had "a 
complete system of practice in the courts, similar in its main features to that 
existing in the code states of the United States" (U.S. Dep;utment of State, 
1905: 32). 
Legal reform was key to establishing a favorable investment climate, which 
in turn was necessary for attracting U.S. corporations to Puetto Rico. It was 
commonly argued that U.S. men of business would further the Americanization 
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of the island. Spanish commercial law was revised to retkct l :.s. concepts of 
corporate rights and protection. In order to establish a favorable investment 
climate, the colonial state passed generous corporate tax laws modeled on 
those in industrial states. Indeed, since Puerto Rico was absorbed into the U.S. 
district court system, the full weight of federal legal protection was extended to 
U.S. firms operating in Pue1to Rico. After these sweeping legal changes went 
into effect, Governor Allen informed potential investors, "Capitalists can be as-
sured of protection to their propetty and investments, hJUaranteed in the form 
of government. in the tax laws, and in the reorganization of the courts, and cap-
ital is pretty sure to take care of it<;elf' (Wood, Taft. and Allen. 1902: 366). 
During the life of the Executive Council (1900-1917) expenditures for the 
coercive apparatus of the colonial state consumed about a quarter of the in-
sular budget. Expenses for operating the penal institutions were the most 
rapidly incre~tsing budget item (Caban, 1999: H1m. The rate of arrests in-
creased over thirteenfold from 1R99 to 1905 but declined slightly by 1916, 
when about 4.5 percent of the population was incarcerated (Santiago-Valles, 
1994: 72). 
PUBLIC EDUCATION AND 
AMERICANIZATION UNDERTHE FORAKERACT 
The remarkable industrial and technological advancement of the United 
States during the Progressive era was popularly attributable not only to the 
dynamism of the Anglo-S:txon entrepreneurial spirit hut to the system of uni-
versal public education. A.mong European governments the radical Ameri-
can idea that education was a right available to all ami not a privilege re-
served for an :mtiquarian elite was seen as a forcL' behind the country's rapid 
emergence as a world power. The British journalist William Stead extolled 
the idea that "the superior education of the American common people was 
the secret of their growing ascendancy." In contrast to the elitism of much of 
European education, which was private and designed to preserve class priv-
ilege, the "universality of education in the United States is probably more cal-
culated than all others to accelerate their progress towards a superior rank of 
civilization and power" 0902: 148). 
Government interest in vocational education, especially manual training in 
the industrial :lit.~. ~tccelerated during the 1890s. By the end of the century the 
United States was a world leader in the manufacturing of machinery. The 
new economv demanded skilled workers, managers. and technicians, and 
the high schoob were expected to provide thi.~ training. But industrialization 
required the immigration of millions of Europeans, many desperately poor 
and illiterate. While they provided the human labor power that fueled the in-
dustrial revolution, they also constituted a potential threat to national unity 
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because of their alien political values and ignorance of the English language. 
Here as well, the public education system was expected to pby a vital role. 
Educators were devdoping an awareness of the centrality of public edu-
cation in creating a sense of national identity among ethnically and linguisti-
cally heterogeneous European populations. State officials were also devel-
oping an appreciation for the systematic use of public education for political 
socialization. The Americanization of the foreigner became a project for lo-
cal and federal government. The noted educator Ellwood P. Cuhberlcy 
preached widely that the public schools should take ·'on the task of instilling 
into all a social and political consciousness that will lead to unity :tmong the 
great diversity" (1918: 357). School authorities experimented with curricula 
that not only provided vocational training hut included English-language in-
struction. civic education, patriotic exercises, and the transmission of values 
and beliefs through the study of U.S. history. 
Given the importance of education to the development of the nation, it is 
not surprising that U.S. empire builders made universal public instruction the 
cornerstone of their Americanization campaigns in the former Spanish 
colonies. The appointments of Major John Eaton, who had served as the first 
commissioner of the 1l.S. Bureau of Education, and the influential educator 
Martin G. Brumbaugh ;.ts education commissioners demonstrated that Puerto 
Rico would be an impo11ant laboratory for testing the latest education theo-
ries--enculturation. vocational training. language acquisition, ami political 
socialization. The education commissioner was appointed directly hy the 
president and given unrL'strictccl authority to design and administer Puet1o 
Rico's public education system. The I )epartment of Education was entrusted 
with the task of transforming a Spanish-speaking people with a four-hundred-
year history and distinct culture into patriotic subjects conversant in the lan-
guage of the colonizers, familiar with their political values, and trained for 
work in the new economic order. In addition, education officials tested the 
applicability of industrial arts, vocational training, and other manual educa-
tion programs in Puerto Rico. 
The department's mandate was extensive: (1) imparting English-language 
skills, (2) instilling civic values, patriotism, and adherence to the colonial 
regime, (3) training Puerto Hicans for managerial, supervisory, 'and technical 
positions in gm·crnment and industry, ( 4) installing a gender-b;tsed educt-
tiona! program in \Vhich women WL're socialized and trained to perform 
tasks that would preserve the traditional male-centered family, (S) prm-icling 
job-related skills in manual and industrial trades for the boys and nL·edle-
work and domestic service for the girls, (6) preparing a select group of 
Puerto Ricans to assume high-level administrative positions in the govern-
ment, and (7) conducting physical education and hygiene instruction. 
The significance assigned to these various goals depended upon the pri-
orities of the education commissioners. Invariably instruction emphasized 
L 
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instilling in youngsters a work ethic that was in harmony with the anticipated 
labor requirements of a new corporate order, as well as providing political 
socialization that emphasized the superiority of U.S. governmental organiza-
tion and institutions. U.S. officials felt that the public education system would 
build loyalty for the United States by generating increased employment and 
earning power among the poverty-stricken rural population. An early gm·-
ernment report noted the public schools were "organized to provide training 
for good citizenship, and one of the first essentials is that the individual slull 
be so trained as to support himself and those dependent upon him" (U.S. De-
partment of State, 190:\: 265). The increased earning ctpacity attributable to 
education and training would, according to one educltion commissioner, 
"convert our rural people into citizens capable of maintaining the sover-
eignty of the state·· (quoted in Negron de Montilla, 1<)71: 153). 
School officials passionately enforced English-language instruction, and 
many considered this the department's most imponant educational task. In-
deed. according to Commissioner Bmmbaugh, ''The first business of the Atner-
ican republic ... is to give these Spanish-speaking races the symbols of the Eng-
lish language in which to express the knowledge and the culture which they 
already possess" (Bmmbaugh, 1907: 65). Implicit in all this, of course, was the 
deeply prejudicial view that English-speaking peoples were the custodians of 
democracy and enlightened republicanism. Over the decades thousands of 
teachers were recruited in the United States and brought to the island to teach 
English to the students and teachers. In 1904 the Depanment of Education hired 
120 teadwrs from the llnited States to provide English-language instmction 
(U.S. Department of StalL'. 1904: 16). In 1917. 193 teachers came from the 
United States ( l i.S. Department of War, 1917: 461 ). 
School officials aspired to educate an indigenous political elite that would 
be at the serdce of the colonial government. They emphasized the necessity 
of instilling "civic virtues" among members of Puerto Rico's "upper class, 
from which must be drawn the directors and administrators of public affairs." 
To this end, scholarships for young Puerto Rican men and women were pro-
vided in 1900 as "part of the plan for instituting Atnerican culture ami Amer-
ican educational ideas into Porto Rico" (U.S. Department of State, 1903: 157). 
They would return to Puerto Rico to assume the role of ambassadors of the 
new sovereign and, with their newly burnished status as cosmopolitan and 
educated coloniab. legitimate the material and social gains to he achieved by 
passively submitting to the assimilationist credo of Americanization. Racist 
constmctions of Puct1o Eicans as falling shot1 of the v~tstly superior Anglo-
Saxon intellect were at the core of American percL~ptions regarding the abil-
ity of Puerto Eicans for advanced education. According to key officials, the 
type of instruction that \Vas required in Puerto Rico was "primarily and es-
sentially one of training rather than of education, of character-building rather 
than scholastic instmction" (Willoughby, 1909: 162-65). While Puerto Ricans 
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lacked the innate cerebral capabilities for abstract thought, they could be ad-
equately trained to mimic the colonizer and perhaps learn to appreciate its 
higher moral character. 
U.S. education officials understood that the school system had an explicit 
ideological role in the imperial project; it was, after all, an agency of Ameri-
canization. These men regularly organized activities and educational pro-
grams to foster patriotism for the United States. Commissioner Brumbaugh's 
first report emphasized the centrality of patriotic exercises in the curriculum. 
Rev. James H. Van Buren, the Protestant Episcopal bishop of Puetto Rico for 
over a decade (1902-1912), went so far as to write that "loyalty to American 
principles and standards is a leading feature of the public school curriculum 
in Porto Rico" (Van Buren, 1913: 151-52). Educational attainment was pro-
moted as essential for fostering responsible citizenry. Elihu Root insisted that 
Puerto Ricans were incapable of self-government because of their Spanish 
cultural legacy and lack of education. The electoral franchise, he argued, 
should be limited to the minuscule percentage of the male population that 
was literate. He felt that with universal public education men "should acquire 
the suffrage on this basis as soon as they are capable of using it understand-
ingly" (1916: 167). Paradoxically, he also endorsed the franchise for males, 
literate or otherwise, who paid taxes to the insular treasury. Root and others 
entertained grandiose aspirations to mold Puerto Rico's people into a bilin-
gual community and convert the island into "a liaison point between English 
speaking and Spanish speaking America" (Clark et a!., 1930: 90). 
Officially, one of the objectives of the public education system was to pre-
pare Puerto Ricans for eventual self-government. However, since educa-
tional instruction seldom went beyond the sixth grade for the vast majority 
of Puerto Rican children, the capacity for the society to exercise self-rule 
could not be demonstrated. Ultimately, it would be Congress that would de-
termine whether Puerto Ricans would be granted the autonomy to conduct 
the affairs of state within their own country. Universal literacy was never a 
condition for admittance of territories as states into the union or, indeed, for 
individual states to govern within their boundaries. In reality, public educa-
tion was perceived as a fundamentally conservative influence that would 
counter what were perceived as radical tendencies among the poor and illit-
erate rural and urban working class. Colonial officials were implanting a sys-
tem of education that almost a century later Howard Zinn would refer to as 
"education for orthodoxy and obedience" 0992: 258). 
Despite the goals of colonial officials and despite the fact that it con-
sumed over a third of the insular budget, the system of public education 
failed both to prepare a literate and patriotic citizenry in sufficient num-
bers, and to produce young men and women with the skills that industry 
demanded. English-language instruction was consistently challenged by 
Puerto Ricans, who recoiled against the often crass and insensitive attitudes 
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of school officials (see Negron de Montilla, 1977). In 1915 the commissioner 
of education reported that the deplorable material conditions of the popu-
lation were hazardous to colonial rule and could not be mollified by the ed-
ucational system, whatever its effectiveness as a socializing agency. The 
commissioner observed with alarm, "The enormous mass of illiterates, in its 
primitive, uncured condition, is not safe timber to build the good ship of 
state. We realize that there are serious social and economic problems that 
have to be solved before the people of Puerto Rico reach the desired goal" 
(U.S. Department of War, 1915: 316). 
The educational process in Puerto Rico was imbued with the ideological 
vision of exercising direct domination over the colonial subjects by persua-
sively devaluing and diminishing their identity. The everyday representation 
of Anglo-Saxon civilization as a desirable but ultimately unattainable goal for 
the inferior colonial subject was a conscious device for holding Puerto Ri-
cans in a permanent state of subjugation. Referring to British imperial exer-
cise of ideological domination in India, Edward Said called this "the quotid-
ian processes of hegemony" (1993: 109). 
BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC EXPANSION 
While public education harbored an explicit ideological project, it had an im-
mediate and pragmatic goal as well. The Department of Education had a def-
inite role in advancing Puerto Rico's conversion into a dependent of the met-
ropolitan economy. The curriculum was designed in part to teach 
rudimentary skills and help turn out a healthy and obedient labor force for 
an economy dominated by sugar and tobacco production and needlework. 
In the decision to employ public education to develop the island's human 
resources, two factors were probably decisive. First, such programs had been 
developed and employed with some success in a number of industrial states, 
and their adoption in Puerto Rico seemed appropriate given the anticipated 
direction of economic growth. Second, Puerto Rico had a demonstrated ca-
pacity as a sugar and tobacco producer and a "superabundance of labor." In 
fact, it was purportedly endowed with such a bounty of natural agricultural 
resources that one excited official was motivated to utter the preposterous 
claim that "the inhabitants can ... exist without any remuneration" (U.S. De-
partment of War, 1900: 36). Because of this "abundant labor force ... Puerto 
Rico had a decided superiority over its natural competitors," [Cuba, Mexico, 
and Central America], "in the most essential element of industrial prosperity" 
(U.S. Department of Commerce and Labor, 1907: 10). But these same officials 
cautioned that Puerto Rico lacked the entrepreneurial talent and business 
acumen to develop industrially. The first colonial governor agreed that the 
country had "plenty of laborers and poor people generally" but what it des-
Tbe Colonizing Mission cifthe United States in Puerto Rico 129 
perately needed was "men with capital, energy, and enterprise to develop its 
latent industries ... and make the country hum with the busy sound of com-
merce" (U.S. Department of State, 1901: 75). 
Official reports portrayed a languorous island patiently waiting for its vast 
pool of labor to be efficiently exploited by these "men with capital." Dreams 
of a vast productive pool of labor were confounded by the reality that 90 per-
cent of the population was afflicted with hookworm, a debilitating intestinal 
disease. Puerto Rico could not hope to develop industrially unless the de-
plorable health and sanitary conditions of the population were dramatically 
improved. Driven by a combination of humanitarian, strategic, and eco-
nomic considerations, the colonial government set about to improve sanita-
tion and health conditions. Accordingly, the government initiated a cam-
paign to "stamp out the disease" in order to succeed in the "rehabilitation of 
the physique of the Puerto Rico laboring people" (U.S. Department of State, 
1904: 28). The school system was recruited into this campaign to provide in-
struction on personal hygiene, sanitation, and nutrition as part of the larger 
campaign to eradicate hookworm. The epidemic-like status of hookworm 
persisted until the 1940s. 
Employment opportunities for the island's impoverished masses did not in-
crease during the steady transition to a corporate-dominated, export-oriented 
economy. In fact, in 1915 the Commission on Industrial Relations reported that 
"unemployment was very prevalent in the Island" and estimated that there were 
between two hundred thousand and three hundred thousand more workers 
available than jobs (Puerto Rico, Bureau of Labor, 1916: 9). According to the Bu-
reau of Labor, "It may be said beyond any doubt that the most serious labor 
problem of Porto Rico . . . is unemployment. . . . It is absolutely necessary to 
take some steps . . . to diminish the great evils of unemployment" (U.S. De-
partment of War, 1915: 428). Yet these same oftlcials reluctantly had to ac-
knowledge that the school system had failed to educate a self-reliant popula-
tion with marketable skills for new labor markets. A special commission 
reported as early as 1912 that "although the Island schools are unquestionably 
helping to make good citizens, it is a grave question whether the present 
arrangements contribute materially to the making of home-makers, producers, 
skilled workers, self-reliant and eftlcient breadwinners" (cited in Clark et al., 
1930: 83). Remarkably, despite the demonstrated inability of the education sys-
tem to impart vital skills to the rural population and tl1e documented failure of 
the corporate sector to absorb the massive surplus of labor, school authorities 
continued to request additional allocations for programs of dubious social 
value. In 1916, despite official acknowledgment of a surfeit of workers in virtu-
ally all labor categories, Commissioner Miller repotted, "There is a demand for 
skilled labor-and unless industrial education is emphasized for the express 
purpose of training artisans skilled in various trades, serious labor troubles will 
probably ensue" (U.S. Department of War, 1916: 357). 
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Making healthy and reliable workers was an important component of the 
colonizing mission, but the Executive Council had a mandate to transform 
the physical landscape in preparation for a rapid transition to corporate-
dominated export agriculture. In 1898 Puerto Rico's physical infrastructure 
was rudimentaty and incapable of suppot1ing a modern agricultural export 
economy. The council pursued the task of modernizing Puerto Rico's primi-
tive and collapsing infrastructure with single-minded determination. It 
granted exclusive franchises to U.S. firms to build and maintain the roads and 
transportation, communications, and related facilities essential for economic 
development. Using the \Var Department as it<> fiscal agent, the colonial state 
issued bonds to gener~1te millions of dollars in loans to finance this ambitious 
undertaking. A pattern of extensive colonial state engagement in sustaining 
a cheap, publicly financed and subsidized infrastmcture \vas established 
during the coutKil's se\ en teen-year life. 
Puerto Rico's commercial development depended upon making the fertile 
interior of the country accessible to commerce and expanding the opportu-
nities for the agricultural exploitation of these regions. Road constmction 
and maintenance became the single most important-and costly-compo-
nent of the ambitious program to rebuild Puerto Rico's infrastmcture. Ac-
cording to Governor Allen, "It is an imperative necessity to devote every dol-
lar which can be spared from the surplus revenue to the constmction of 
permanent roads" (lJ.S. Department of War, 1901: 73). By 1910 approxi-
mately a thousand kilometers of first-class roads hac! been built, almost four 
times the amount built by the Spanish (RiguaL 1967: 90). Road construction 
and maintenance v..·as the Interior Department's largest single expenditure in 
1912, consuming over half of the department's budget and about one-tenth 
of all funds disbursed by the insular government (calculated from U.S. De-
partment of War, 1912: .:)23-24). 
The ambitious road construction and maintenance program helped 
dampen the acute unemployment problem, but the demand for jobs among 
the unemployed "was so great many have to be refused." Those fortunate 
enough to get hired received "30 cents per day-a small amount, but doing 
a great deal of good" (U.S. Department of War, 1901: 328). However, even 
these paltry expenses for labor were considered excessive as constmction 
costs for the road-building program threatened to consume a dangerously 
large share of the state's revenues. In 1903 the clepa11ment terminated the 
program to hire day laborers as a way of temporarily alleviating unemploy-
ment, but road building was too important for economic and military secu-
rity to scale back. The agency sought to resolve its budgetary problems by 
relying on convict labor \vherever possible as a cost-cutting measure, this de-
spite the fact that unemployment hovered around 20 percent. The governor 
applauded the success of the convict labor program and its cost-efficiency. 
"Prisoners ... are paid a wage of '5 cents per day," which amounted to "less 
.... 
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than one fourth the wage paid free labor" (U.S. Department of War, 1914: 
307) In 191 "i the attorney general also happilv reported that the convict la-
bor program had saved the treasury over ~76,000. about 10 percent of what 
the colonial government spent on salaries (calculated from lJ.S. Department 
of War, 1915: 33, 262). Prison maintenance expenses \vere amply reimbursed 
by the savings realized with com ict labor. Given the profitability of this ven-
ture, the governor authorized the Interior Department to employ convict la-
bor for road construction whenever possible. Despite its preference for im-
prisoned labor, the department reluctantly had to employ free wage labor, 
but, mindful of the wage structure in effect in the plantations, the govern-
ment capped the daily pay of common laborers hired by state agencies at 45 
cents. The law equalized wages in order ··ro protect the coffee and sugar dis-
tricts from the loss of labor consequent on the payment of greatly increased 
wages hv the government'' (C.S. Depattment of War, 1904: 23 ). 
The de\·clopment of the sugar industry was an integral part of the U.S. col-
onizing mission. However, large-scale commercial sugarcane cultiv:ltion 
could not be undertaken profitably in the southern coastal plains. since the 
area lacked adequate water and rainl~lll. In 1908 the legislature authorized 
construction of an cxtensi\'e irrigation system for the region. This project was 
directly beneficial to the United States, according to the chief engineer, be-
cause the country depended '·heavily on Puerto Rico for its supplies of rmv 
sugar" (U.S. Depal1ment of State, 1908: 184). The irrigation system became 
operational in 1914 and supplied water to twentv-four thousand acres in the 
southern coastal plain of Guayama (U.S. Department of War. 1911: 42). Nat-
urally, sugarcane acreage prices soared, given rilL' increased yields and re-
duced risk. In Guayama the value of cane land jumped from $99 in 1907 to 
between $350 and $400 an acre in 1917 (U.S. Department of State. 190?): 7 (J: 
US Department of War, 1917: 336). The large sugar corporations \Vcre the pri-
maty beneficimies of the new irrigation system. Small sugar producers. bur-
dened by high property taxes, monopoly prices for railroad transit. ami ex-
pensive imported fertilizers and other inputs, were highly motivated to sell 
their land to the U.S. absentee corporations that began to invest in the area. 
Guayama became one of the districts most characterized by the concentra-
tion of productive assets by absentee corporations. 
The sale of insular bonds was routinely arranged hy the Bureau of Insular 
Aff:tirs of the \\Jar Department to obtain quick infusion.s of capital to finance 
public works projects. The purchasers of insular government and municipal 
bonds realized substantial earnings on these bonds, which were backed by 
the U.S. Treasury Department. As early as 1911 the total insular and munici-
pal bond indebtedness for ruad construction and irrigation projects was $5.3 
million-an unusual level of debt considering that the total receipt.s in th:1t 
year \VLTC S6.8 million (U.S. Department of War, 1911: 41, 304). The colonial 
state·s ddJt continued to increase and by I() I?) had doubled, reaching $10.8 
132 Pedro A. Cahan 
million (Clark et al., 1930: 326). The state turned to the bond market because 
it could not generate the necessary revenues to sustain the frantic pace of in-
frastructure development. However, debt financing had serious conse-
quences for long-term development. The Brookings Institute reported that 
the bonowing policy had ·'been definitely harmful." It warned that "borrow-
ing has been a great waste of public revenue by diverting it to the payment 
of interest, while the piling up of debt charges is almost certain to cause 
hardships for the country during future periods of reduced prosperity'' (Clark 
et a!., 1930: 5(Jil). 
In 1 ()l (J the colonial :tel ministration realized that the revenue shortfall was 
jeopardizing its oper:ttions. Governor Yager warned that ''the only solution" 
to the revenue prohkm was ''to increase the tax on th<: property of the island 
which rccciH·s most of the benefits of government. and whose owners are 
the most able to pay for this support." He informed the legislature that "an 
unusually large percentage of the property of the island is owned by non-
residents," and he criticized "these absent owners" because "they contribute 
practically nothing to the insular government which has done so much for 
them. The increase in the value of their property is almost wholly clue to the 
improvements furnished by, and the fostering care of, the insular govern-
ment'' (U.S. Department of War, 1917: 261). Despite this generous treatment, 
the absentee sugar corporations delayed or refused to pay taxes and dTcc-
tively orchestr~tted a tax boycott by engaging the government in protracted 
legal battles to block enforcement of the tax laws. 
By 191 H an infrastructure had been built that included thmt.~ands of kilo-
meters of roads, irrigation systems, clams and hydroelectric projects, railways 
and tramways, telegraph and telephone systems, and ports-many financed 
and built by till' colonial state. These utilities were mali<: r<:adily available to 
absenree sugar corporations, often at highly subsidized rates. Puerto Rico's 
trade profile was altered as the island became a small but important market 
for industrial goods and technology that were used to build and maintain the 
infrastructure. Infrastructure development also facilitated the den:ttionaliza-
tion of productive assets by reducing the entry costs to U.S. firms-by low-
ering the costs for energy, transportation, and communications. Moreover, 
this early pattern of direct colonial state financing of infrastructure develop-
ment is one of the permanent features of capitalist development under colo-
nial management. 
OTHER INSTITUTIONS FORAMERICANIZING PUERTO RICO 
The U.S. Army :md the American Federation of Labor (AFL) were other insti-
tutions actively engaged in Americanizing Puerto Rico. In March 1899 an 
army battalion of Puerto Rican volunteers was formed under the command 
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of U.S. army officers. According to U.S. officials, the Puerto Rican Regiment 
was an important institution for promoting the Americanization of the island. 
Army training was said to impose the "mental and moral discipline which 
comes from unremitting enforcement of those rules of conduct without 
which industrial and moral progress are impossible" (Rowe, 1901: 335). Even 
before the United States had invaded Puerto Rico, the Harvard law professor 
A. Lawrence Lowell had recommended that "natives of the island be re-
cruited into the ranks" of the army and the navy because it was "a potent 
force in fostering the affection of the people of Puerto Rico for the United 
States. There is certainly nothing that stimulates loyalty to a flag so much as 
serving under it" (1898: 59). Governor William Hunt was "certain that the or-
ganization of the Porto Rican provisional regiment has been of material aiel 
in the general work of education. Its existence has stimulated patriotism and 
aroused a pride in the honor of the flag" (U.S. Department of State, 1903: 15). 
By 1900 the AFL was involved in the Puerto Rican labor scene. Puerto 
Rico's largest labor organization, the Fecleraci6n Libre de Trabajadores (Free 
Federation of Labor-FL D was an affiliate of Samuel Gompers's U.S. labor 
federation. In Puerto Rico as in the United States, the AFL effectively de-
politicized industrial labor relations and focused workers' demands on im-
mediate economic struggles. Under its guidance the FLT accepted the prem-
ise that Puerto Rico's workers should limit their demands to negotiating 
improvements in their material conditions within the industrial and political 
order imposed by the United States. To the extent that the workers were in-
vested in collective bargaining with the employers and not confronting the 
agencies of the state that protected corporate interests, the FLT and the AFL 
allayed opposition to colonial rule. Indeed, according to Governor George 
Colton, by 1916 the AFL "was the most effective factor in Americanizing the 
people of Porto Rico" (U.S. House, 1924: 82). Samuel Gompers boasted that 
"there is no factor that has been of such value in Americanizing the people 
of Porto Rico than has the American labor movement, the American Federa-
tion of Labor" (U.S. Senate, 1916: 114, 113). 
UNIONSANDTHE POLICE 
In March 1908 the Insular Police Service was established and placed under 
the general supervision of a three-person police commission appointed by 
the governor. The colonial authorities justified the routine deployment of the 
insular police during militant labor strikes as necessary to protect the prop-
erty of large landowners. The political consequences of establishing a con-
stabulary of poor Puerto Ricans under the direct command of the governor 
and commanded by a U.S. military officer were significant. Puerto Ricans in 
the employ of the colonizers were charged with preserving the very structure 
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of property relations ami social authority th:1t was provoking widespread 
militancy. 
As early as 190'5 the police were ordered to handle "a strike situation in the 
sugar districts:· hut the most extensive and militant strikes broke out be-
t\\ ccn 191 ') and 1916. when eighteen thousand workers brought twenty-four 
of the thirty-nine largest plantations to a h:dt for three months (rleagle, 1917: 
1 lcJ). The director of bhor observed th:ll the strike of agricultur:1l workers 
"has been considered the most important in Pue1to Rico since the American 
occupation,. (U.S. Department of War, 1915: 42/i l. These strikes were also 
among the most violent of the first two decades of colonial rule. Officials re-
ported that •·fires occurred :md other kinds of damage were clone all over the 
island during that period"' and the ''work or the police force was considerably 
increased during the JXlSt year by the strike· oi' agricultural \\·orkers which be-
gan in January'' (U.S. Depattment of War, 1915: 425; 1916: 18). 
During these particularly violent strikes, many of the cane fields were 
torched and machinery and buildings destroyed by workers. Governor Yager 
reported that he "could not ignore the appeals for protection against such 
acts of lawlessness :mel disorder" (U.S. I kpartment of War. 191 ): 36). In the 
ensuing battles police killed five workers in Vieques and another in Ponce, 
dozens were wounded, :mel over three hundred workers vnTe arrested (Igle-
sias Pantin, 19)8: 188-89). Reports leave little doubt that the police used ex-
cessive force in suppressing these strikes. 
Faced vvith uncompromising hostility from the sugar corporations and un-
responsive colonial authorities, the FLT called on the AFL to come to its de-
fense. The AFL successfully pressed its supporters in Congress to establish an 
industrial relations commission to investigate state violence against the strik-
ers. According to the commission, the series of strikes "which began in Jan-
uary, 191 ), \Vas not only justified but was in the interests of the progress of 
the island. The long hours, low wages, and exploitation of laborers could not 
ha\c been relieved except by organized action" (Marcus. 1919: 19). The 
commission concluded that the insular police were primarily responsible for 
the ,-iolence and criticized the actions of the local police magistrates (Mejias, 
1946: H7). The labor bureau critically observed that "whatever the actions of 
the strikers may have been, there cannot be any justifiable cause for the ac-
tions of the police and of the municipal authorities," who "violated the incli-
viclual rights of the strikers. often times treating them with unforgivable bru-
tality" (Santiago-v~dles. 1 'Nl: 114). 
The FLT applied for fc·deral governrnent intervention to constrain the ex-
ploit.ltive practices of the corporations, while inculpating the colonial au-
thorities for violating the rights of workers, but at no time did it repudiate the 
sovereignty of the United States. In fact, it supponecl annexation for Puerto 
Rico because it believed only if it were a state in the union would workers 
be protected by federal Llhor legislation and constitutional guarantees. 
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THE JONES ACT: THE SECOND COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION 
In 1917, after almost two decades of growing Puerto Rican frustration with 
the Foraker regime, Congress voted into law Puerto Rico's second organic 
act. The Jones Act was a wartime emergency measure enacted by Congress 
on the eve of t:.S. entry into \X!orld War I. The imposition of political calm 
and loyalty in this troublesome insular possession was a crucial security ob-
jective for the United States a.~ it made preparations for war in Europe. The 
metropolitan government sa\v the persistent challenges by Puerto Rico·s 
dominant political party and other <:lites and increasing popular opposition 
to the colonial regime, particularly to the Executive Council, as evidence of 
the growing appeal of independence. The United States believed that the 
Jones Act would mollify these disgruntled voices while reasserting its impe-
rial dominance over the island and its people. The Jones Act centralized 
power in the office of the governor and mandated continued U.S. presiden-
tial appointment of the commissioner of education and the attorney general. 
A Justice Department was established under the authority of the attorney 
general, who continued as the chief law enforcement officer and 3dminis-
trator of the system·s penal administration and control. Nonetheless, the 
Jones Act was portrayed as an enlightened measure that significantly liberal-
ized the colonial regime by eliminating the despised Executive Council and 
establishing a popularly elected upper house. 
The Jones Act signaled the end of the aggressive Americanization C3m-
paign and introduced a new phase in the colonizing mission. Policy makers 
abandoned any serious idea they may have entertained regarding the use of 
Puerto Rico as a social laboratory for Americanization. After 1917 the goals 
of U.S. colonial rule in Puerto Rico were influenced by the island's changing 
economic and strategic roles in the American empire. 
Puerto Rico emerged as an important sugar producer for the U.S. market 
and evolved into an even more crucial geo strategic asset during World War 
I. The European war had devastated sugar beet production and led to world-
wide sugar shortages. Suddenly, the sugar-producing insular possessions of 
the United States became extraordinarily important to a U.S. economy that 
was becoming increasingly internationalized. As a result of escalating de-
mand for sugar and tropical products, Puerto Rico became a particularly lu-
crative investment .site for U.S. absentee firms. The inter-war period severely 
tested the abilitv of the United States to administer Puerto Rico pc:tccfully. By 
1932 mass sectors of the population languished in deplorable poverty ancl 
enervating disease and malnutrition. Puerto Rico's condition glaringly ex-
posed the fallacy of economic theories that equated capitalist development 
with social equity. Consequently, Washington's goals in Pue1to Rico were to 
preserve political stability, contain labor militancy, and defend the tarnished 
legitimacy of colonial rule. 
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The ]one,~ Act is best kncJwn for conferring collecti\ c U.S. citizenship on 
the people of Puerto Rico. This grant of citizenship was novel because it 
gave Puerto Ricans few of the political and civil rights accorded native-born 
or naturalized citizens of the United States (see Smith, 1997; Cabranes, 1979: 
96). According to General Macintyre, chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, 
the purpose of granting citizenship to Puerto Ricans was "to make clear that 
Porto Rico is to remain permanently connected with the United States" ("l:.s. 
Department of War, 1916: 18). The grant of citizenship did not augment the 
already extraordinary plenary powers that Congress exercised over Puerto 
Rico and its people. hut it did have the perverse psychological impact of dra-
matically demonstrating t:.S. resolve to retain Puerto Rico as a colonial ap-
pendage. 
Remarkably, while the Jones Act conferred collective naturalized citizen-
ship on Puerto Ricans, it did not require literacy or t1uency in the English lan-
guage. Nonetheless, the public schools intensified English-languag..: instmc-
tion in order to further the civic education of Puerto Ricans. Moreover, given 
the collapse of the insular labor market, public schools became immediately 
engaged in preparing a barely literate population for self-employment and 
petty commodity production. By the early to mid-1920s the colonizing mis-
sion, heralded with almost evangelical fervor as a moral campaign destined 
to elevate a dependent and inferior people to the status of Anglo-Saxon civ-
ilization, was e,~sentially abandoned as an ideological project. 
THE SCHOOLS AND CAPITALISM 
Although corporate profits increased during and after \v'orld War I, Puerto 
Rico's econonw degenerated into a morass of poverty and social immisera-
tion that demonstrated the failure of the United States, despite its great 
wealth, to provide its colonial ward with economic security and social jus-
tice. By the 1930s corporate domination of the economy had provoked a so-
cial crisis that threatened the stability of Puerto Rico. Unemployment, land-
lessness and disease were so extensive as to place U.S. strategic and political 
objectives at risk The supert1uity of labor for capitalist production was one 
of the more serious potential challenges to social stability. The federal gov-
ernment \Vas acutely aware of the unfolding social crisis in the isbnd. Colo-
nial officials repeatedly commented on the depres,~ed wages that kept work-
ers at barely subsistence levels and worried that unregulated market forces 
would create an unmanageable social crisis. 
Puerto Rico experienced the brunt of the global deprc,~sion of the 1930s. 
Salaries declined as the cost of imported food increased, and unemployment 
climbed. Absolute levels of poverty, malnutrition, landlessness, and disease 
escalated. Governor Theodore Roosevelt Jr. reported in 1930 that "more than 
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60 percent of our people are out of employment, either all or part of each 
year" (U.S. Department of War, 1930: 2). Congressman Johnson alerted his 
colleagues in 1930 that "the distress in Porto Rico among those citizens of ours 
is almost beyond words to express. More than 600,000 people of Porto Rico 
are woefully undernourished. . . . They work when they can, but there is so 
little work at so little pay-pennies not dollars" (U.S. House, 1930: 11345). 
Even for those lucky enough to find work, wages were often too low to meet 
their minimum needs. Governor Towner reported that "since 1915 the cost of 
the sugar laborer's diet has increased 48.6 percent, while his wages have in-
creased but 26.5 per cent. . . . The fact remains that for agricultural laborers 
the wages paid have not increased as rapidly as the cost of living" (U.S. De-
partment of War, 1925: 35). Puerto Rico's working population was not only 
poor but sickly and malnourished. Governor Roosevelt observed that the 
"death rate in this disease [tuberculosis] was higher than that of any other 
place in the Western Hemisphere, and four and one-half times the death rate 
in the continental United States" (U.S. Department of War, 1930: 1). 
The public education system, after all, was supposed to prevent such con-
ditions. The unconscionable unemployment levels, while ultimately a func-
tion of market forces, did expose the fiction in government declarations re-
garding the success of the education system. After decades of significant 
expenditures, which consumed almost a third of the insular budget, govern-
ment officials were forced to admit that massive illiteracy continued to 
plague the population. In 1931 less than half of the 483,348 school-aged chil-
dren were enrolled in the public schools, and of those enrolled in the rural 
schools 83 percent dropped out before completing the fourth grade. Since 
vocational training began in the second-unit schools, that is, after the sixth 
grade, only a small percentage of the rural children received adequate in-
dustrial and vocational instruction. According to officials, the literacy cam-
paigns amounted "only to a smattering of the rudiments of an education 
which will probably wear off very soon after the children leave school" (U.S. 
Department of War, 1931: 69). 
Despite these sobering assessments, colonial officials continued to dream of 
molding Puerto Rico's people into a bilingual community that would serve as a 
bridge between the United States and Latin America. Juan B. Huyke, the first 
Puerto Rican education commissioner, reported that bilingual education was 
emphasized because "Porto Rico is about halfway between North and South 
America," and it was a "proper location ... for training of student<> for the im-
portant work of uniting the Americas" (U.S. Department of War, 1929: 375). By 
the mid-1920s the University of Puerto Rico envisioned itself as a pan-American 
university with specific diplomatic and economic responsibilities. The univer-
sity was "to lend to the leaders in extra-governmental activities in North, Cen-
tral and South America the bilingual, bicultural, and intercontinental resources 
of Potto Rico" (quoted in Rodriguez Fraticelli, 1991: 155). 
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By 1931 the hypothesized positive relationship between economic 
growth, increased demand for trained workers, and higher wages was se-
verely shaken. The economy continued to demand contingents of cheap, rel-
atively unskilled rural labor for employment in the sugar industry as field la-
borers. Even in the needlework industry, whose relatively skilled workers 
were trained in the public schools, wages were very low. The pool of un-
skilled labor required for the sugar-dominated corporate sector readily ex-
ceeded demand. The synergy between industry and the school system that 
had been advocated as a critical function of public education had essentially 
collapsed by the end of the 1920s. The education commissioner candidly ad-
mitted that "the effotts put forth in the past in the direction of vocational ed-
ucation have f~1ilcd in many cases'' (U.S. Department of War, 1931: 76). 
Faced with the magnitude of the economic crisis of the early 1930s, the 
schools attempted to impart skills and knowledge that would assist impov-
erished families in their struggle to survive. A priority for the system was ed-
ucating young people in some rudimentary skills so that they could exercise 
a measure of control over their lives in an economy that had left them be-
hind. Programs in the common schools were expanded to train young peo-
ple in carpentry, cooking, sewing, cultivation, and other skills that could pro-
vide livelihood. These schools were thought to be "the most promising 
agency . . . for improving the unsatisfactory conditions under which our 
peasants live and converting them from a liability into an asset" (U.S. De-
partment of War, 1930: 105). In the early 1930s a gender-based curriculum of-
fered boys courses in agriculture, carpentry, and shoe repair while girls were 
instructed in home economics and social work. Both boys and girls took in-
dustrial arts courses; for girls this meant primarily needlework. The purpose 
of this curriculum was to train the rural poor to eke out a bare living on the 
margins of the economy as independent commodity producers. If they were 
fortunate enough to generate a surplus, they could enter the market as petty 
commodity producers. 
The rationale for this curriculum reveals much about the role of public ed-
ucation in developing human resources in light of the disastrous labor mar-
ket conditions. The objective of the manual training and industrial trades was 
to "improve the quality of work and establish a standard for the products so 
that they may be marketable and thus become a dependable means of sup-
port." Shoemaking was directly related to the effort to protect the jibaro from 
hookworm since the disease was contracted through the foot. The home 
economics curriculum emphasized cooking and sewing and was intended to 
teach the girls of the rural districts to do the things that would allow them to 
have a "more healthful and happy life with an appreciation for their homes" 
(U.S. Department of War, 1929: 390). Agricultural instruction consisted pri-
marily of gardening with the aim of raising food crops so that families might 
be able to meet some of their nutritional needs. By participating in the petty 
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commodity sector. employed workers could supplement their meager earn-
ings from salaried work. The desperate need to impmn:' sanitation and re-
duce the spread of contagious diseases prompted the curriculum in physical 
education and hygiene. 
The educational curriculum reflected the bias of the p;ttriarchally consti-
tuted social system of the United States. While Puerto Rico was experiencing 
\Vrenching economic dislocations, public school authorities employed the 
school system tore-inscribe women's reproductive role in the male-centered 
family. The gcndered curriculum socialized youngsters into understanding 
and accepting the legitimacy of a gender-based division of labor within the 
systL·m of generalized commodity production that \\as rapidly unfolding. 
Women were trained in activities and household tasks related to the eco-
nomic reproduction of the family unit that were not necessarily required in 
the formal labor sector. 
When the war in Europe \·irtually halted it'i lace and embroidery expotts, 
manufacturers in the United States increased production, and many turned 
to Puerto Rico. where labor was abundant and cheap. In 1918, the needle-
work industry was targeted by the Department of Education for its capacity 
to employ huge numbers of unemployed young women. Jose' Rosario, an of-
ficial in the depattment, pointed to the "pressing duty of the rural schools to 
train the country girls to do this work in a more efficient way and so increase 
their income and the income of Porto Rico .. (Rosario, n.d.: 691-92). School 
officials held conferences with manufacturers and dL·signecl special needle-
work courses that met the manufacturers' specifications. Private schools 
were also accredited in needlework, dra\\'n work, and embroidery (U.S. De-
partment of War, 1923: 182-83). By 1920, projected demand for skilled work-
ers who were "expert in needlework" exceeded supply, and the legislature 
authorized hiring additional instructors in those municipalities where the 
prospects of employment were most htvorable. Throughout the 1920s. de-
mand for this skilled but very low-paid labor held steady. In 1931 the federal 
government financed vocational training in Puerto Rico and declared that 
"the principal emphasis will he laid upon training for jobs in the needle 
trades which are dominant industries in Porto Rico" (Society for the Ad-
vancement of Education, 1931: 558-59 J. \Xromen constituted by far the ma-
jority of the labor in needlework, and their work, despite miserable pay, was 
skilled and demanding. The schools not only prepared women for incorpo-
ration into gender-segmented lahor markets but sustained the needlework 
industry by providing fresh contingents of cheap female labor trained spccif-
icall y for it. 
As an instrument for the dissemination of an imperial ideology the school 
system appears to h~l\ e been at best pat1ially successful. Rarely was more 
than half of the eligible student population enrolled in any giwn year, and 
mandatory instruction was seldom enfotTL'cl past the fourth year. Privately 
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commissioned as \H~ll as government studies documentl'd the failure of the 
school system to transmit knowll'dge and training in areas critical to eco-
nomic growth and societal well-being. The needlework industry represents 
one of the few sectors in which the hoped-for synergy between the public 
school system and industry vvas realized. 
The emergence of a vocal anti-American movement was a telling indica-
tion of the failure of the colonizing mission. Although the Nationalist party 
never posed a threat to U.S. colonial control, its violent activities galvanized 
the nation. The party's charismatic leader, Pedro Alhizu Campo.s. threatened 
the legitimacy of coloni:d rule and attracted more adhl'rents to the national-
ist cause than the locd l'lites were willing to tolerate. 
The Nation:dist party emerged as a militant reaction to the corruption and 
complacency of the Socialist and Republican Party coalition that controlled 
the legislature during the 1920s and early 1930s. But Albizu Campos directed 
his most vituperative diatribes against the l.J.S. government and absentee cor-
porations. He lashed out against the colonialism that was impoverishing his 
people. and the local capitalist class that had amassed fortunes from this ex-
ploitation (Albizu Campos, 1979: 43). He imbued the nationalist movement 
with radicalism that resonated with ever-growing numbers of Puerto Ricans. 
He declared, "North American interests occupy a great part of our lands and 
are owners of almost eighty pucent of the total wealth of the country; by 
virtue of this forced feudalism the majority of the electorate of this country 
are made dependc·nt on its will" (Albizu Campos. 1 l):)O: 1 5). 
By the earlv 1930s it seemed that the very process of Americmization was 
generating its ~mtithesis. till· formation of a nationalist vision of Puerto Rican 
identity and the emergence of political forces committed to promoting this 
identity. Unrestrained market forces had precipitated a social and economic 
crisis that persuaded the Democratic administration of Franklin Roosevelt in 
the early 1930s to intervene to save its crumbling Caribbean colonial posses-
sion. The modernization of the colonial state"s coercive capabilities and its 
emphasis on protecting the rights of private property were elements of the 
colonizing mission. But opposition to the colonial order intensified vit1ually 
in unison with the growing social and economic immiseration. Opponents of 
the regime pointed to the growing contradiction between an official ideol-
ogy of democracy and economic fairness and a colonial policy that increas-
ingly relied on coercion and compulsion to enforce the mle of b\v. 
THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE COLONIAL SUBJECT 
The arri\·al of an alien power that usurps a people"s sm crcignry is always 
traumatic for the colonized nation and historically has proven to be a 
wrenching and violent process. While the U.S. invasion and annexation of 
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Puerto Rico did not precipitate a social uprising or bloody confrontation be-
tween the colonizers and the indigenous peoples, it was a traumatic e\-ent. 
The speed and depth of Puerto Rico's transformation into a highly lucrative 
export platform for U.S. corporations ultimately destroyed a people's way of 
life. The change in sovereignty not only eradicated the sources of power and 
privilege of Puerto Rico's traditional political elite but also elevated to promi-
nence other political actors who subscribed to the colonial enterprise. 
U.S. officials gained enough support from key sectors to institute wide-
spread institutional changes. Domestic capital and some of the professional 
strata that stood to gain under the new sovereignty worked closely with the 
colonial authorities (sec Quintero 1\ivera, 1')88). These sectors aspired to 
form a lW\V economic and social order in which they would assume the 
perquisites of titular political authority. In the process they hoped to displace 
the traditional landed elite that had assumed prominence during the waning 
years of Spanish dominion. Support for U.S. sovereignty extended to other 
sectors. ln a society wracked by unemployment, hunger. and disease. those 
fortunate enough to be employed by the colonial regime had privileged sta-
tus. Puerto Rican participation in the colonial administration served to legit-
imate metropolitan rule and was used by ll.S. officials as evidence that 
Puerto 1\icans had consented to their own subordination. Despite these 
changes in the class composition and domestic political configuration, re-
sistance did emerge to impede the U.S. effort to Americanize the Puerto Ri-
can people. 
The system of public education that had been heralded as the jewel of the 
Americanization program failed to achieve many of its objectives. Rather 
than preparing an educated, skilled, and loyal colonial subject, the school 
system was called upon to instruct the impoverished rural population in the 
skills they needed to sutYive. Capitalist development in Puerto Rico did not 
generate a significant demand for skilled labor. \Vhat the sugar and tobacco 
corporations needed was an unskilled, cheap, and complacent labor force-
the younger and healthier, the better. Puerto Rico's experience under colo-
nial management and capitalist de\ elopment exposed the cupidity sub-
merged in the ideological discourse that equated economic grovvth \vith 
political democracy and social equity. 
The experiments in social engineering conducted in the great national lab-
oratory th:tt policy makers called Puerto Rico did not conYert Puerto Ricans 
into a bicultural and bilingual people. Many of the bro;tcler goals of Anteri-
canization went unrealized. Admittedly, many of these goals were often ill-
defined and grandiose, but the implied objective was to pacify the Puerto Ri-
cans into accepting the superiority of the U.S. polity and its natural right to 
rule their lives. Although conflicting policy objectives :md political aspira-
tions in the federal government led to inconsistent and contradictory initia-
tives, the multiple instances of resistance to colonial authority revealed the 
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durability of l'ulTto Rican national identity and the resiliency of its cultural 
sovereignty. Americanization was not only a generalized project to assimilate 
and transform an inferior people and its institutions but also a celebratory 
discourse on the power and wisdom of the American political system and 
American business. The hesitancy of Pue11o Ricans to embrace this myth was 
a sobering realization to U.S. empire builders. 
NOTES 
1. Technicallv the llnitnl SL!tes did not have sovereignty over Cuba. l :nder Article 
1 of the Treaty of Paris ( liNHl Spain relinquished son'reignry over C:uh~1. and the 
United States \\·as to ";Jssume and discharge the obligations that may under interna-
tional law result ti·om the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property." 
2. For a lcngtlw examination of the complex and varied responses of different sec-
tors in Puerto Rico to U.S. colonial policy, see Cahan (1999). 
3. This idea of the concordance between dcrnocracy, market economies, and trade 
\vas a centerpiece of President George W. Bush's message at the 2001 Summit of the 
Americas: "Open trade reinforces the habit of liberty that sustains democracy over the 
long haul. Free enterprise requires lihetty and enlarges liberty." Bush Comments at Sum-
mit of the Americas Working Session, April 21, 2001. http:! /usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/ 
sutnmit/<Jpening.htm. 
4. Typified by Senator Albert Beveridge's statement: "And of all our race he has 
marked the AmLTi,·an people as His chosen nation to finallv lead in the regeneration 
of the world" (quoted in Smith 1997: 431). 
5. According to Isaac lkrkson, in his 1920 study on the Americanization of Euro-
peans in the continental l'nitcd States, "Newcomers from foreign lands must as 
quickly diYest themseln~s of their old characteristics, ~llld through intermarriage and 
complete taking ()\t'r of the language customs, hope.', aspirations of the American 
type obliterate all ethnic distinctions. They must utterly forget the land of their birth 
and completely lose from their memory all recollection of its traditions in a single-
minded adherence to American life in all its aspects'' (Berkson, 1920). 
6. For example, William Hunt, Puerto Rico's second appointed governor, believed 
that "every effort must be made not only to teach new doctrines and ideas, but at the 
same time to destroy the prejudices. ignorance and the false teachings of the past" 
(U.S. Department of State, 1904: 13). 
7. See Trias Monge (1991: esp. l"i4-161) for the noted jurist's views on why the legal 
changes were effected so quicklv and failed to provoke notable resistance. The opposi-
tion Federal p:111\' boycotted the elections of 1900 in pa11 because Governor Allen did 
nothing to ldt the campaign of physical intimidation against the party's candidates. 
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